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Abstract
As the volume of mortgage credit has risen in tandem with house price inflation, the sub-prime
homeloan sector of this market has begun to expand in order to meet demand from those not
serviced by the mainstream financial service providers. This article examines the role of local
authorities in providing residential mortgages and assesses whether those who have traditionally
borrowed from non-market (or public sector) lenders would be considered to be sub-prime
borrowers by the private sector. It concludes that, in view of the relatively low average incomes
of this cohort of borrowers, they represent a higher probability of homeloan default and as a
consequence, would be subject to a higher cost of credit in the private sector. However, this
paper highlights the favourable terms offered by local authorities and argues that their failure
to price according to the risk profile of borrowers exposes the Exchequer to higher – and often
unquantified – costs in pursuit of promoting home-ownership.

Keywords: Sub-prime lending; Mortgage Credit; Affordability

Introduction
Since the 1990s the twin dynamics of historically low interest rates post-monetary policy
integration combined with unprecedented house price inflation as supply lagged behind
demand have combined to drive Irish residential mortgage debt ever higher. Compared to
most other European Union (EU) member states, Irish homebuyers rely heavily on debt
financing. Consequently, the Irish housing market has produced high residential mortgages
relative to GDP at 60 per cent plus compared to the EU25 average of approximately 40 per cent.
This reflects an emergent pattern in the Anglo-Saxon region of the EU that includes the UK,
Germany and others (European Capital Markets Institute, 2006).
Throughout 2006, more than 50,000 new homeloans were granted each quarter with new
borrowing valued at almost €10b. These figures indicate continuing strong growth in demand for
mortgage products and suggest a mortgage market with an annualised value in excess of €40b.
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This lending brought the total residential mortgage market to €121bn with a growth rate of 26
per cent (CBFSAI, 2006). However, although the total outstanding mortgage credit has effectively
doubled within 2 years (see Figure 1), the annual growth has fallen throughout 2006 and by the
end of the year was at its lowest level since late-2005.

Figure 1: Trend in Outstanding Residential Mortgage Lending, 2004 – 2006
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Source: Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Monthly Statistics (Various, 2006).

In Ireland, as in many other countries, the market for residential mortgages is disjointed. The
traditional lenders enjoy the largest market share but credit is also provided by public bodies and
by specialist financial institutions other than the mainstream, commercial banks. Similarly, there
exist more than one category of borrower; these can be classified as prime and sub-prime with the
mainstream banks generally unwilling to service the latter, higher risk cohort.
These sub-prime borrowers tend to experience difficulties in accessing mortgage credit from
traditional lenders for a number of reasons, such as previous credit problems, irregular income
and recent marital separation amongst others (Irish Mortgage Corporation, 2006). Consequently,
the projected higher probability of default associated with such borrowers is recognised in the
pricing structure used by those private sector lenders willing to provide credit to these consumers
and sub-prime borrowers can expect to pay significantly higher interest rates than their prime
counterparts.
It has been estimated that this particular sub-section of the market is valued at €1b (or 2 per
cent of all new residential mortgages in 2006) although this expected to rise to €4b by 2010.
This is an emerging market with only one private sector lender providing sub-prime homeloans
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in 2006 although this is projected to expand as the value of the market grows. However, this is
not the entire picture. Many homebuyers unable to access traditional mortgage products have
availed of an alternative to the new private sector sub-prime lenders and indeed, have been able
to do so for many years prior to the entrance of a private sector lender. For many decades, the
local authority sector has been a source of residential mortgage credit and although it has been
somewhat displaced by the growth of private sector lending, it is still effectively a ‘lender of last
resort’ for those who cannot borrow from a commercial bank because their income is insufficient
but who are deemed by this sector to have a good credit record nonetheless.
It should be noted that those applying for non-market (public sector) mortgage credit share many
of the characteristics attributed to sub-prime borrowers. Recent research (Shiels et al., 2007)
undertaken by the Centre for Housing Research found that many homebuyers availing of local
authority annuity loans were likely to be dependent upon social security benefits as their primary
source of income and/or to have a household income below the national median. Similarly, these
homebuyers were also likely to have a high incidence of payment arrears and most importantly,
were actually required to prove an inability to access mortgage credit from a traditional lender in
order to avail of a local authority mortgage.
This article examines the role of non-market mortgage credit and the relationship of these funds
to market. The pricing structure of this credit is critically considered and the implications of the
risk of default for the Exchequer are explored. This analysis is presented in three sections and
these are as follows:
Section Two considers the role of the HFA (Housing Finance Agency) and the local authorities in
the provision of residential mortgage credit to low-income homebuyers. The extent of competition
and interplay between the public and private sectors is explored in addition to the comparative
cost of funds.
Section Three considers the similarities between those accessing local authority annuity loans and
those considered by the private sector to be sub-prime borrowers in order to determine whether
any – or all – of the former are indeed sub-prime. Consequently, the author examines the balance
between cost and risk for local authority loans and considers the efficacy of vetting and advisory
mechanisms in protecting the Exchequer in the absence of financial penalties similar to those used
by the private sector (e.g. very high interest rates). Finally,
Section Four sets out the key issues arising from this analysis.
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Provision of Non-Market Homeloans
The local government sector has played a role in the provision of homeloans since 1899 and
until the 1950’s, these were available to all households (Norris and Winston, 2002). With the
liberalisation of credit markets, the private sector has increasingly assumed a dominant portion
in the provision of residential mortgage credit and consequently, restrictions were introduced
limiting local authority loans to low-income borrowers. By 2005, the share of the mortgage
market attributable to local authorities had fallen to 0.1 per cent from almost 50 per cent three
decade before. Local authorities made loans to only 193 borrowers in 2005 (see Table 1) – a
reduction of 60 per cent over a decade – although this excludes those who purchased under any
of the affordable housing supports. When these are included, the actual number paid is probably
closer to approximately 4,000 loans per annum.

Table 1: Trend in Local Authority Mortgages Paid, 2000 – 2005
New
Houses

Other
Houses

Total 		
Mortgage

Share of
Market

Year			

N

€m

2000

52

61

113

4.7

0.1

2001

71

84

155

10.7

0.1

2002

93

131

224

17.6

0.2

2003

108

10

721

516.4

0.1

2004

134

812

151

6.2

0.1

2005

105

88

193

14.4

0.1

Source: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government (various years). Note: Total volume of loans is exclusive
of Shared Ownership, Affordable Housing and Tenant Purchase transactions.

The DoEHLG (Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government) determines the
income eligibility limits and loan maxima for these loans. These are not index-linked but rather,
they are revised at irregular intervals – just twice in the five-year period 2000-05. In 2004, the
income limit was raised to €36,800 from €32,000 and €92,000 from €80,000 for single and dualincome households, respectively. The maximum loan available from a local authority was raised
from €130,000 to €165,000. This latter change brings the maximum loan value to 60 per cent of
the average price of a new house compared to 80 per cent in 2000 (see Figure 2). Similarly, these
changes meant that the average industrial wage equated to almost 80 per cent of the income
eligibility limit for a single person. However, given that the average disposable income (after taxes
and social transfers) was almost €50,000 per household at the start of the decade, this implies that
those on intermediate incomes will exceed this threshold.
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Figure 2: Trends in Local Authority Housing Loan Parameters relative to Prices and
Incomes, 2000 – 2005 Source: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local
Government (various years)
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Note: Income eligibility limits refer to a single person.

These loans are financed using funds raised by the Housing Finance Agency (HFA) using a
government guarantee. The HFA has performed this role for twenty years; prior to 1986 the Office
of Public Works (OPW) provided the funds for residential mortgages to the local authorities.
The HFA raises funds from the financial markets in large tranches in order to minimise the
associated cost of capital and provides the borrowings to the local authorities for housing-related
purposes, including the provision of residential mortgages. In 2005, a cumulative total of €579m
was advanced by the HFA, an increase of just 3 per cent in annual lending since 2001 and very
small in the context of a rapidly expanding market (see Figure 3). Almost all of these funds were
provided at a variable rate. This has tended to be the most common loan type in recent years as
the use of fixed rate and index-linked loans has fallen from €100m to €100,000 since 2002.
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Figure 3: Trend in the Value of Loans Advanced to the Local Authorities, 2001-2005
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Total Loans Advanced (d,m)
Source: Housing Finance Agency (2006).

By 2005, almost €3b in local authority mortgage debt was outstanding. This reveals that the
non-market sector equates to approximately 3 per cent of total mortgage debt in the State. This
outstanding credit is repayable to 64 local authorities – implying that 39 housing authorities have
granted no homeloans for many years – although the extent of lending activity varies significantly
with Dublin City Council accounting for one quarter of all outstanding debt (see Appendix).
Furthermore, as Table 2 shows, half of all outstanding loans were of 21 to 30 years duration
although, at 23 per cent, a significant minority of borrower’s complete repayments within 5 years
and perhaps this reflects a very low initial LTV (loan-to-value ratio) amongst many buyers.

Table 2: Outstanding Loans by Loan Duration, 2005
Duration
0-5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years
21-25 years
26-30 years

Total
€m
677
138
227
361
984
509

%
23
5
8
12
34
18

2,896

100

Source: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government (various years) and Housing Finance Agency (2006).
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When the HFA advances funds to the local authorities, the latter add 0.5 per cent for administration
and servicing costs before making funds available to borrowers. At end-December 2006, mortgage
credit was available to borrowers at a variable rate of 4.5 per cent, roughly equivalent to a 1
per cent margin (or 100 basis points) above the ECB rate. This is the same as the margins used
by commercial banks when lending to prime customers but is significantly lower than the rate
available to sub-prime customers from specialist banks which is typically 350 basis points or more
above the ECB rate. The rate available from local authorities has also tended to be quite stable and
although it broadly mirrored the trend in the ECB rate, the full extent of the fluctuations in the
latter has not been transmitted to borrowers (see Figure 3). For instance, the ECB rate had moved
on many occasions throughout 2005 but the local authority variable rate remained stagnant at
2.95 per cent and, indeed, it was not until the margin between the base rate and rate available to
borrowers had fallen as low as 0.6 per cent that the rate was raised to 3.25 per cent in early 2006.
Moreover, although the local authorities do not compete directly with the private sector – they
are prohibited from doing so as public policy promotes that sector as the lender of first resort
for residential mortgages – the product they provide is quite competitive and tends to undercut
private lenders by 0.25 per cent for variable rate loans and 0.05 per cent for a 5-year fixed rate
loan. With regard to variable rate loans, the average in the private sector fell within a range of
4.35 to 4.78 per cent and as Table 4 shows, this can equate to a saving of €12 to €64 per month to
local authority customers. Interestingly, mortgage finance is made available by the non-market
(or public) sector at a competitive rate despite two principal constraints, as follows:
The credit risk for the local authorities is recognised as being potentially higher for a range of
reasons; these are addressed in the following section, and The HFA does not engage in other forms
of personal finance. In contrast, private sector lenders operate a business model which allows for
narrow margins in the mortgage market to be compensated by higher margins elsewhere (e.g.
credit cards, etc.) in order to attract new custom.
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Table 3: Estimated Comparative Cost of Credit by Sector, 2006
		

Private Sector Credit

Interest Rate
I
		
		

Public Sector Credit

€

i

(annual)		

€
(annual)

Upper Level

4.78%

12,686

-

-

Lower level

4.35%

12,063

4.25%

11,920

Difference (Saving to LA Borrowers)
Upper Level				

-766

Lower level				

-143

Note: Costs of repayment calculated on a 30-year standard variable mortgage for €200,000. Mortgage protection and other charges
excluded. Average variable interest rates in the private sector are as reported to the CBFSAI for November 2006.

Figure 4: Comparative Movements in Key ECB Rate and Interest Rates from Local
Authorities to Borrowers, 2001(July)–2007(January)
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Source: Housing Finance Agency (HFA) and European Central Bank (ECB), (Various Years). Note: The HFA does not offer a
tracker mortgage product.
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Since 1987, local authorities lend only to those who have been refused mortgage credit by the
private sector and/or those low-income households participating in homeownership support
schemes (e.g. tenant purchase, affordable housing, etc.) with the exception of those availing of the
Affordable Housing Initiative (AHI) which can have no direct impact on the General Government
Finances. In 2004, it was announced that a private sector lender would introduce a mortgage
product for those purchasers approved by the bank. Prior to this development, mortgage finance
for affordable housing purchasers (1999 Affordable Housing Scheme and Part V Affordable
Housing Scheme) had been provided exclusively by the local authority sector.
This change had the benefit of introducing consumer choice and competition to the affordable
housing market whilst also allowing this cohort of purchasers secure mortgages in excess of
the maximum local authority loan limit and ensuring that the AHI would be operational. This
change has not benefited all those households using these homeownership supports as it does
not extend to those using the Shared Ownership Scheme. However, the availability of private
sector credit has not proved popular and to date, only a small proportion of affordable housing
purchasers have availed of this option (see Table 5) with more than 90 per cent continuing to use
local authority loans within 18 months of their introduction.
It is important to note that the availability of this form of mortgage credit has been beneficial from
a social policy perspective. Over and above simply facilitating access to owner-occupation, it is
possible to argue that it has contributed to the better re-distribution of wealth. Housing has come
to represent the main source of wealth held by any individual household (Malpass, 2005) and in
the context of the current house price boom, this is particularly true for Ireland. By making the
purchase of a home a feasible proposition for many low-income households, these local authority
loans have enabled them to benefit from the strong capital appreciation of the past decade.
Moreover, although this has been achieved at some cost to the State (see Section 3) there is likely
no alternative scenario in which the Exchequer would save financially. For example, were the
State to charge an interest comparable to that of the private sector – or indeed, to abolish these
loans completely – it is likely that many potential borrowers would de-facto be debarred from
owner-occupation. Many of these, in turn, would likely fall back on the State provision and it
is likely, the consequent cost would be even greater. For example, in the absence of this form
of mortgage credit the volume of applicants for social housing would likely rise with knock-on
public expenditure under rent supplement (in the interim), the construction and management of
social housing and the making available of discounts under the Tenant Purchase scheme.
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Table 4: Use of Public and Private Sector Credit among Affordable Purchasers, 2005
1999
Affordable		
Scheme		

Part V
Scheme

Affordable

		
Total

Private 		
Credit
Total

Private
Credit

Carlow
Clare
Cork
Donegal
Dun Laoghaire- Rathdown
Fingal
Galway
Kerry
Kildare
Kilkenny
Laois
Leitrim
Limerick
Longford
Louth
Mayo
Meath
Monaghan
North Tipperary
Offaly
Roscommon
Sligo
South Dublin
South Tipperary
Waterford
Westmeath
Wexford
Wicklow

0
0
98
0
0
16
36
0
0
0
44
0
5
0
8
6
0
29
0
0
0
0
237
0
0
3
16
18

0
0
2
0
0
0
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2
14
121
5
93
198
11
6
33
10
22
0
15
0
2
53
17
0
1
13
0
0
97
11
41
18
24
1

0
14
1
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
15
0
2
0
9
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
11
1
0
0

Cork
Dublin
Galway
Limerick
Waterford
Grand Total
%

46
295
0
0
0
857
100.0

32
2
0
0
0
529
6.1

6
138
1
0
9
62
100.0

0
0
0
0
1
60
6.2

County Councils

City Councils

Source: DoEHLG. Note: Figures for Town Councils are subsumed into the relevant County Councils.
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Local Authority Customers – Sub-prime Borrowers?
The local government sector provided mortgage finance to approximately 4,000 households in
2005 – in addition to the 193 purchasers referred to in Section 2, there were also 730 Shared
Ownership transactions and the overwhelming majority of those 3,500 affordable housing and
tenant purchasers who opted to avail of local authority loans.
These loans can be made up to 97 per cent of the value of a property subject to a maximum loan
of €185,000 in 2007. In order to be assessed as eligible, applicants must comply with the following
criteria:

• 	Be able to prove that you cannot get a loan from a bank or building society (some local
authorities require evidence of more than one refusal)
•

Comply with the income test

•

Be in need of housing

•

Be registered on a local authority housing waiting list

• 	Be a local authority tenant or tenant purchaser wishing to return your property to the
local authority, and
• 	Be a tenant in a home provided by a voluntary body wishing to return you property to
the local authority.
These criteria ensure that there will be a higher potential risk associated with borrowers but this is
offset by the social policy advantage of promoting both credit and homeownership opportunities.
The requirement that borrowers be unable to access private sector mortgage finance implies that,
by definition, they are sub-prime. Recent research conducted by the Irish Mortgage Corporation
(2006) found that sub-prime customers experience problems in obtaining credit from the
traditional banks and tend to show the following characteristics:
•

Irregular income

•

Recently separated

•

Previous credit difficulties.

These characteristics are also shared by many of those who have accessed local authority loans
and moreover, there are similarities in terms of loan delinquency and other factors. Given
these observations, it is worth noting that customers of the private sector sub-prime market
pay significantly higher repayments by virtue of their risk profile. For instance, the principal
incumbent Start – a joint venture between GE Money and IFG Group – achieved 360 basis
points above the Euribor (ECB) and it is expected that a new entrant will target a margin of
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300 plus (Davy Research, 2007). By contrast, local authorities do not charge similarly high rates
– regardless of the risk of default – but take only a margin of 100 basis points, as previously
mentioned, and thus borrowers save significantly. On the basis of the example in Table 4, a local
authority customer could pay up to €3,000 or more extra per annum in the private sector.
The associated disadvantage with sub-prime lending is loan arrears and in the worst-case scenario,
serious delinquency followed by repossession. Serious delinquency has been defined as mortgages
that are more than 90 days in arrears. The US experience suggests that sub-prime borrowers are
seven times more likely to be seriously delinquent than their prime counterparts and although
there are no directly comparable statistics for Ireland, the differential is likely to be comparable.
For instance, recent research has found that approximately half of all low-income purchasers in
Ireland (e.g. those availing of local authority mortgage credit) recorded some degree of arrears in
2003 (Shiels et al, 2007). These rates are far in excess of those of the commercial mortgage lending
institutions where, for example, 7.2 per cent of mortgages had arrears in 2001 (Irish Mortgage
and Savings Association, 2002).
In the case of non-market sub-prime borrowers, the incidence of serious delinquency is very
high, ranging from a fifth to two-fifths of users of the schemes. Figure 4 shows the results for
borrowers under a selection of schemes in two urban local authorities. The figures for the Tenant
Purchase and Shared Ownership schemes cited below indicate the level of serious delinquency.
The research by Shiels et al (2007) noted that those with substantive arrears were likely to have
initially defaulted on the payment of their mortgage protection insurance before beginning to
miss mortgage repayments at a later date, followed ultimately by more pronounced non-payment.
This is consistent with the behaviour of borrowers in the US and Chinloy (1995) notes that default
is a three stage sequential process consisting of initial delinquency, long-term non-payment and
ultimate default. However, it remains unclear the extent to which local authorities in Ireland
pursue the ultimate sanction of repossession.
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Figure 5: Percentage of Participants in the Low-Income Home Purchase Support
Schemes in Urban Local Authority Areas who Experienced Loan Arrears of Three
Months or More at end-2003
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Source: Shiels, Norris, Coates and Kane (2007).

The incidence of arrears on these types of mortgages has increased in recent years – a review
conducted by the DoEHLG in the late 1990’s found that almost 20 per cent of loans were in
arrears but the comparable figure in 2003 was much higher. This change has occurred at a time
when the underlying demographic composition of those households accessing local authority
loans has also been changing. Specifically, households are now less likely to be married but rather,
are more likely to be headed by a single or separated person (see Figures 5) reflecting a further
comparison with the characteristics of sub-prime borrowers, as outlined earlier. This trend
applied to all mortgages and particularly those who availed of the Shared Ownership scheme. A
similar shift was evident for the tenant purchase scheme and the local authority loans scheme,
but it was less dramatic.
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Figure 6: Change in Marital Status of all Mortgage Borrowers and Participants in the
Low-Income Home Purchase Support Schemes between 1992/93 and 2002/03
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Source: Shiels, Norris, Coates and Kane (2007). Note: The reference to Local Authority Loans excludes those availing of these
loans under the terms of the other schemes.

Figure 6 indicates that households headed by a separated person were over-represented relative
to the general populace. This implicit relationship between marital status and the incidence of
arrears amongst those availing of non-market mortgage credit is again similar to the position
in the private sector sub-prime market. Moreover, the international research in this field has
found that the sustainability of owner-occupation among low-income households implies that
such households are more likely to require two earners and that family break-up will have a
disproportionately adverse impact upon women (Early and Mulholland, 1995; Malpass, 2005).
With regard to the latter issue, the majority of separated heads of household in Figure 6 were
women.
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Figure 7: Proportion of Separated Non-Market Borrowers Compared to the General
Irish Population, 2002/03
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Source: Shiels, Norris, Coates and Kane (2007).

Given the presence of the income test and the relatively low level at which the thresholds are set,
the mean income of those who have borrowed from the local authorities tend to be low. This, in
turn, implies that proportion of income required to service borrowings is likely to be high and
this raises important questions regarding the sustainability of homeownership as evidenced by
the extent of loan arrears. Figure 7 shows that the income of those with local authority mortgages
has tended to lag behind that of all households in the State. This gap has widened over time and
by 2003, the gross mean weekly income of those local authority tenants purchasing their home
was only half that of the national average with those using the Shared Ownership and Affordable
Housing schemes only slightly better-off.
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Mean Gross Weekly Income in f

Figure 8: Change in Estimated Gross Mean Weekly Household Income for
Low-Income Home Purchase Supports and All Households, 1990–2003
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On this basis, it is reasonable to conclude that many, though not all, of those availing of local
authority loans share the same characteristics as sub-prime homebuyers in the private sector – in
terms of low-income, marital status and the incidence of arrears – and would be considered to
do so by that sector. However, the non-market sector does not impose higher repayment costs
to balance the higher risk of arrears and/or default, as is the norm among commercial lenders,
but rather, makes credit available at a competitive rate. Although this plays a positive role in
broadening opportunities for homeownership, it does expose the Exchequer to a potential high
risk of non-repayment with the associated costs, particularly given the fact that local authorities
are not always proactive in managing arrears with the opportunity cost of such funds foregone
borne by the State.
It is therefore worth considering the systems in place to minimise the risk of arrears and whether
these can be effective in protecting the Exchequer. In the first instance, credit counselling is
available to low-income borrowers and ideally, this should mitigate the risk of non-repayment of
mortgages. This type of service is common in many countries and in Ireland the Money Advice
and Budgeting Service (MABS) provide financial advice to those seeking assistance. By 2006,
almost 11,000 new clients had been seen by MABS and these clients reported €48m outstanding
in debts to financial institutions including banks and credit unions (DoSFA, 2006). Although
approximately 21 per cent of MABS clients had mortgages, there are no statistics available on the
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rate of mortgage default post-counselling and as such, it is difficult to fully assess the effectiveness
of this service.
Moreover, commercial lenders avail of credit checking facilities in order to minimise the risk of
default on any mortgages granted. This process involves an examination of the credit history of
an applicant and a determination on the degree of risk associated with any loan. Ireland does not
have a compulsory public credit register but since 1963 there has been a private credit bureau.
This bureau pools information from many lenders over a number of years and the lenders then
use this system of information sharing on the creditworthiness of their borrowers in order to
reduce default rates. The type of information shared in Ireland includes arrears, defaults and debt
exposure (Jappelli and Pagano, 1999).
However, the vetting processes employed by local authorities would seem to be much less
developed. Several officials in this sector informed the author that the only steps undertaken
prior to approving a loan were to confirm that household income complied with the income test
criteria and to check the level and cost of any outstanding loans. Consequently, the process used
does not generally allow a local authority make an informed decision based upon any gradation
of risk – notwithstanding the obvious initial refusal of the commercial lender – but rather, they
can only chose to grant or refuse the application of an eligible household. On this point, the same
officials informed the author that for this reason the volume of refusals was very low and that the
balance between applications received and refused was not actively monitored by the DoEHLG.

Conclusions
The availability of relatively low cost mortgage credit from the local government sector has a
number of key advantages for both low-income households and public policy generally. These
loans expand opportunities for credit and homeownership and in doing so, ensure that the
market is complete with the greatest benefit accruing to those who are unable to use the services
of traditional lenders.
Local authorities make mortgage finance available to low-income homebuyers and in doing
so, there is necessarily a trade-off between expanding opportunities for accessing credit at an
affordable cost against a risk of non-payment of this debt. This paper has set out the case for
classifying those availing of this type of mortgage finance to be sub-prime, both in terms of income
and demographic factors but more importantly, taking the incidence of serious delinquency
and previous mortgage refusals as the benchmark. This cohort can avail of loans from the nonmarket sector and can do so at a cost of repayment which is significantly less than that charged
by specialist lenders in the private sector. Moreover, sub-prime borrowers in the latter sector will
often use these lenders in the short to medium term in order to repair a poor past credit history
prior to re-financing with a traditional lender; this option is open to those with local authority
loans but without the additional cost.
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It is for the purpose of removing this obstacle to ever greater owner-occupation that these loans
are available but questions must be raised as to whether, in their current format, they are always
beneficial to mortgagor and mortgagee. The level of repayment difficulties encountered by many
borrowers implies that a high proportion of mortgages granted are unsustainable and that the
vetting procedures are insufficient – these do not supply local authority lenders with much
needed data and as such, represent an imprudent approach to risk and financial management
of public funds. Given that these loans are apparently intended for those with low incomes but a
good credit history, it is important that the DoEHLG consider whether the extant combination
of vetting procedures and credit counselling are sufficient to minimise the risk of arrears and
achieve overall public policy ends.
Moreover, the current levels of immigration combined with a strong take-up of self-employment
opportunities would suggest that the demand for sub-prime mortgage finance will increase in the
future, as these are typically determinants of the need for this type of credit. Given the comparative
savings available from the non-market sector, this would suggest that demand for local authority
loans will rise and both the DoEHLG and the HFA should consider the ability of the sector to
respond accordingly and seek to minimise the potential cost and risk to the Exchequer.
As such, it is possible to set out a number of alternative scenarios from a public policy perspective
therefore, including:
Were this source of non-market loans to be abolished, it is unlikely there would accrue any saving
to the Exchequer. In contrast, the loan arrears avoided could well be more than countered by the
cost to the State in terms of an increased take-up of rent supplement, social housing and other
supports.
Rather than abolition – or even a higher interest rate – a review of the systems and procedures for
vetting and approving applications could prove more effective. This would better enable the loans
to achieve their stated objective whilst ensuring greater value for money.
The provision of residential mortgage credit by the local authority sector to those unable to access
private sector alternatives is an important housing policy intervention. However, the systems and
procedures must be sufficiently robust to protect both the borrower and the Exchequer.
*The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of
the funders or board of management of the Centre for Housing Research.
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